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Abstract 
Australia, witb its lengthy coastline, vast maritime jurisdiction and multiple offshore territories, 
undoubtedly fits the description of a maritime nation: but it was not until the issue of Australia's Oceans 
Policy in 1998 Ihat a comprehensive statement of Australia's maritime challenges and priorities emerged 
at the Federal Government level. The Oceans Policy arliculated a diverse array of challenges and priorities 
relating to Australia's maritime interests, including the conservation of marine biological diversity, the 
maintenance of ecologically sustainable fisheries, the prevention of marine pollution, the development of 
lhe offshore petroleum and minerals industry, the definition or Australia's maritime juridiction and the 
protection of Australia's national interests both within and beyond Australian maritime jurisdiction. In 
addition to these fundamental maritime challenges and priorities, the Oceans Policy highlighted some 
emerging challenges, such as improving and disseminating our knowledge or the role of the oceans in 
climate change and developing, using and exporting Australia's ocean energy resourees. To tackle all 
these challenges and priorities in a balanced and effective manner, the Oceans Policy identified the need 
ror integrated ocean planning and management, and nominated specific responses for particular sectors 
of ocean activity. Thirteen years on from the Oceans Policy, it is timely to reassess some key maritime 
challenges and priorities identified in that document to determine their relevance to the current strategic 
and political envi· ronment for Australia and the Asia·Paeific region. This chapter will examine a selection 
or these maritime challenges and priorities, their applicability to Australia's current geostrategic 
circumstances and some recent developments in responding to them. 
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Australia with its lengthy coastline, vast maritime jurisdiction and multiple offshore 
territories undoubtedly fits the description of a maritime nation
1
 but it was not until 
the issue of Australia’s Oceans Policy in 1998 that a comprehensive statement of 
Australia’s maritime challenges and priorities emerged at the Federal Government 
level.
2
 The Oceans Policy articulated a diverse array of challenges and priorities 
relating to Australia’s maritime interests including the conservation of marine 
biological diversity, the maintenance of ecologically sustainable fisheries, the 
prevention of marine pollution, the development of the offshore petroleum and 
minerals industry, the definition of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction and the 
protection of Australia’s national interests both within and beyond Australian 
maritime jurisdiction.
3
 In addition to these fundamental maritime challenges and 
priorities, the Oceans Policy highlighted some emerging challenges such as improving 
and disseminating our knowledge of the role of the oceans in climate change and 
developing, using and exporting Australia’s ocean energy resources.
4
 To tackle all 
these challenges and priorities in a balanced and effective manner, the Oceans Policy 
identified the need for integrated ocean planning and management and nominated 
specific responses for particular sectors of ocean activity. Thirteen years on from the 
Oceans Policy, it is timely to re-assess some key maritime challenges and priorities 
identified in that document to determine their relevance to the current strategic and 
political environment for Australia and the Asia Pacific region. This paper will 
examine a selection of those maritime challenges and priorities, their applicability to 
Australia’s current geostrategic circumstances and some recent developments in 
responding to them. 
Identifying Australia’s Maritime Challenges and Priorities 
Australia’s Oceans Policy had the ambitious objective of setting in place the 
framework for integrated and ecosystem based planning and management for all of 
Australia’s marine jurisdictions which would be implemented through the 
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development of Regional Marine Plans based on large marine ecosystems and 
intended to be binding on all Commonwealth agencies with responsibilities in the 
marine environment.
5
 It set out broad goals for the care, understanding and use of 
Australia’s oceans. These included: 
• The exercise and protection of Australia’s rights and jurisdiction over 
offshore areas, including offshore resources; 
• Meeting Australia’s international obligations under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and other international 
treaties; 
• Understanding and protecting Australia’s marine biological diversity, 
the ocean environment and its resources and ensuring ocean uses are 
ecologically sustainable; 
• Promoting ecologically sustainable economic development and job 
creation; 
• Establishing integrated oceans planning and management 
arrangements; 
• Accommodating community needs and aspirations; 
• Improving Australia’s expertise and capabilities in ocean related 
management, science, technology and engineering; 
• Identifying and protecting Australia’s natural and cultural marine 
heritage; and  
• Promoting public awareness and understanding of the oceans.6 
Whilst the overarching vision of integrated oceans management for Australia’s 
offshore marine environment has been modified since the issue of the Oceans Policy, 
the Policy did perform the important initial function of expounding the major 
maritime challenges confronting Australia in twenty areas of oceans planning and 
management together with proposed responses.
7
 It identified the need for specific 
3 
 
action under several broad headings including ocean uses and impacts, protecting 
national interests and understanding the oceans.  
The second volume of Australia’s Oceans Policy enumerated measures to 
address Australia’s maritime challenges in specific sectors of ocean activity under the 
broad headings identified in the first volume of the  Policy. Governmental responses 
to Australia’s maritime challenges since the Oceans Policy have tended to occur 
within specific sectors of ocean activity rather than being prompted by the  regional 
marine planning process initiated by the Oceans Policy or its successor, the marine 
bioregional planning process which is being implemented under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act , 1999. While some sectors have 
adopted a more integrated approach to oceans management, cross sectoral cooperation 
in oceans management is still developing within Australia’s maritime jurisdiction.
8
 
Subsequent sections of this paper will analyse key challenges identified in the Oceans 
Policy, projected responses and recent developments in addressing those challenges. 
Defining and Describing Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction 
Critical factors in managing Australia’s offshore areas are defining clearly the extent 
of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction and understanding  the physical nature of the 
marine areas under Australian jurisdiction. The Oceans Policy characterised this 
challenge as defining, describing and documenting the physical, geological and 
chemical attributes of the marine areas under Australian jurisdiction, including the 
continental shelf and the physical and chemical structure of the adjacent oceans.
9
 
Australia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
10
 in 
1994 assuming a wide range of international legal obligations in relation to its 
offshore areas. One of the major achievements of the LOSC was to provide clearly 
defined maximum limits for offshore jurisdictional zones including the territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Australia had 
already claimed a twelve nautical mile territorial sea in 1990 and a continental shelf 
based on earlier criteria in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
11
 In 
1994 Australia claimed a contiguous zone adjacent to its territorial sea out to the 
maximum limit of 24 nautical miles provided for in the LOSC.
12
 Australia’s exclusive 
economic zone was also proclaimed in 1994 out to the maximum limit provided for in 





The Oceans Policy noted that technical advice and information on mapping, 
seafloor morphology, geology and resource potential were required to support 
Australia’s claim for a legal continental shelf extending beyond the exclusive 
economic zone under the provisions of the LOSC and also to support Australia’s 
negotiations on maritime boundaries with adjacent countries.
14
 GeoScience Australia 
and its predecessor agencies, Australian Geological Survey Organisation (AGSO) and 
the Australian Survey and Land Information Group (AUSLIG) have continued to 
meet this challenge as evidenced by the endorsement of Australia’s recommendations 
for the outer limits of nine of the ten areas of its extended continental shelf claim by 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in April 2008
15
 and  
successful maritime delimitation negotiations with New Zealand in 2004 since the 
Oceans Policy was issued.
16
 The scientific data gathered by agencies such as 
GeoScience Australia on the physical, geological, oceanographic and chemical 
aspects of the water column and the seabed has also been vital in meeting other 
challenges within Australia’s marine areas such as conservation of marine 
biodiversity, ecologically sustainable fisheries exploitation and the development of 
Australia’s offshore petroleum and minerals industry. 
Managing Rights and Responsibilities on Australia’s Extended Continental Shelf 
Sustainable management of Australia’s extended continental shelf will present 
enormous challenges. The extended continental shelf, located beyond 200 nautical 
miles (up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles from the 2500 
metre isobath) from the coast of Australia and its offshore territories encompasses an 
area of 2.56 million square kilometres or around a third of the land mass of 
continental Australia.
17
 Extended continental shelf areas contain a cornucopia of non 
living resources with the most obvious being seabed oil and gas but also including 
manganese nodules, polymetallic sulphides, gas hydrates and phosphorates.
18
 There 
are also valuable living resources on the shelf including sedentary species such as 
trochus shell and beche de mer (sea cucumber).
19
 The relatively shallow depths of 
many parts of the extended continental shelf make exploitation of the living resources 
practical and attractive to authorised and illegal fishers.  Valuable marine genetic 
resources with proven medical, pharmaceutical and industrial benefits have been 
discovered at seabed features such as hydrothermal vents and cold seeps and are 
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already supporting a thriving international bio-prospecting industry.
20
 The catalogue 
of potential resources that could be derived from Australia’s extended continental 
shelf areas may well be incomplete because scientists are still in the process of 
researching these areas. International acknowledgment of Australia’s claim to the 
substantial resources bound up in these remote areas is only the first step in realising 
this bounty. To exploit these resources, Australia and its exploitation contractors will 
have to grapple with multi-objective management in a complex, legal, investment and 
operating environment. 
All areas of Australia’s extended continental shelf lie far beyond its territorial 
sea limit of 12 nautical miles beneath vast tracts of high seas water column. Under 
international law the high seas are not owned by any State.
21
 This means that vessels 
and aircraft of all States can exercise a wide array of freedoms in these areas, 
including freedoms to navigate, to conduct marine scientific research, lay submarine 
cables and pipelines and, subject to limited conservation and management measures 
imposed by some regional fisheries management organizations, the freedom to fish.
22
 
Under the relevant provisions of the LOSC, Australia’s exploitation of the extended 
continental shelf must not infringe or interfere with navigation and the other rights 
enjoyed by the global community in these areas.
23
 The siting of installations to drill 
for hydrocarbons or mine seabed minerals on the extended continental shelf will need 
to take account of established shipping routes in the area, the location of submarine 
cables and pipelines and the existence of equipment related to marine scientific 
research on the seabed. The potential for disputes arising between Australia and other 
States with interests in the water column above Australian extended continental shelf 
exploitation sites cannot be discounted and will have to be factored into investment 
decisions. 
Investors in exploitation activities on the extended continental shelf also face 
the prospect of some of their profits being surrendered because Australia is obliged to 
make annual payments or contributions in kind for all production at an extended 
continental shelf site after the first five years of production at that site.
24
 The 
payments are made to the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the supranational 
body established under the LOSC to administer the exploitation of deep seabed 
minerals beyond national jurisdiction. The ISA will distribute payments to States 
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which have ratified the LOSC, taking into account the interests and needs of 
developing States.
25
 The proportion of profits to be remitted to the ISA is not 
inconsiderable, commencing at 1% of the value or volume of production at the site in 
the sixth year of production and increasing by 1% for each subsequent year until the 
twelfth year of production and remaining at 7% in subsequent years.
26
 
There will be significant logistical and security challenges involved in 
establishing and protecting exploitation activities on Australia’s extended continental 
shelf. Offshore installations located in remote extended continental shelf areas could 
be vulnerable to attack by terrorists and more susceptible to the severe weather events 
that are predicted in connection with climate change. Illegal exploitation of 
Australia’s extended continental shelf resources is a real threat. To counter this threat 
more surveillance and enforcement patrols will be necessary. Australia has limited 
resources to conduct comprehensive surveillance and monitoring of its exclusive 
economic zone out to 200 nautical miles from its coastline let alone scanning 
activities occurring beyond this limit.
27
 Experience garnered from enforcing 
Australia’s fisheries legislation in waters surrounding remote offshore territories such 
as Heard and McDonald Islands foreshadows some of the jurisdictional dilemmas and 
practical difficulties which may be encountered by maritime enforcement units. Two 
foreign vessels suspected of illegal fishing in these remote waters were only 
apprehended in waters south of South Africa after lengthy hot pursuits across 
thousands of miles of ocean.
28
 In addition, the extended continental shelf areas around 
Heard and McDonald Islands fall within the Antarctic Treaty area and contractors in 
these areas will be subject to the stringent environmental protection provisions of the 
Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.
29
 Distinguishing between legitimate marine 
scientific research activities conducted from foreign vessels on Australia’s extended 
continental shelf and illegal foreign bio-prospecting for marine genetic resources will 




Other global governance imperatives related to the protection of the high seas 
marine environment and its biodiversity are relevant to extended continental shelf 
areas. The international community has been discussing the conservation of high seas 
biodiversity in a Working Group established by the United Nations General Assembly 
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(UNGA) and considering a range of options for more effective biodiversity 
conservation.
31
 These include developing environmental impact assessment and 
strategic environmental assessment guidelines for all activities, plans and programmes 
affecting high seas areas and options for marine spatial management in 
environmentally sensitive high seas areas.
32
 The introduction of high seas biodiversity 
conservation measures in extended continental shelf areas may impose some 
constraints on resource exploitation. Policy makers, scientists and industry players 
eager to explore and take advantage of the potential resource bounty on Australia’s 
extended continental shelf will have to come to terms with operating in a complex 
environment influenced by both national and international regulation. 
Protecting Australia’s National Interests at Sea 
The protection of Australia’s interests at sea is a multi-faceted challenge which ranges 
from preventing potential aggressors crossing Australia’s maritime approaches and 
deterring criminal activity in Australian offshore zones to supporting regional and 
global security initiatives which help maintain freedom of use and access to the 
oceans for vessels worldwide. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is the primary 
government organization responsible for meeting this challenge although other 
government agencies such as Customs, Australian Fisheries Management Agency 
(AFMA), Immigration, Australian Quarantine Inspection Service, Australian Federal 
Police and state police services also contribute. The Oceans Policy listed projected 
responses to this challenge which have evolved in recent years as a result of specific 
threats such as the increase in people smuggling in Australia’s northern sea 
approaches and illegal fishing to the north of Australia and in the offshore zones of its 
sub Antarctic islands in the Southern Ocean.
33
 Initiatives have been taken at national, 
regional and global levels to protect Australia’s national interests at sea. 
National Initiatives 
One response highlighted in the Oceans Policy was a full contribution by the ADF to 
the National Surveillance Program managed by Coastwatch.
34
 This program, 
originally coordinated by Coastwatch and involving a range of Commonwealth 
Government agencies, has now been replaced by Border Protection Command, a joint 
ADF and Customs organization which draws on ADF and Customs assets to perform 
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surveillance and enforcement tasks in Australia’s offshore zones.
35
 The Oceans Policy 
also foreshadowed the development of an integrated surveillance system combining 
all surveillance sources in a single system to provide continuous real-time, all weather 
detection and identification of aircraft and ships in Australia’s maritime approaches.
36
 
The Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS), introduced in February 2005, 
is an important component of this system with the objective of providing enhanced 
maritime domain awareness of shipping and other activity in Australia’s offshore 
zones to Border Protection Command.
37
 AMIS operates through the phased request of 
positional information from non Australian flagged vessels seeking to enter Australian 
ports. Up to 1000 nautical miles or 48 hours steaming time from the Australian coast, 
Australian authorities request advanced arrival information from International Ship 
and Port Security Code (ISPS) vessels whose next port of call is Australia. This 
information on ship identity, crew, cargo, location, course, speed and intended port of 
arrival is already collected for Australian Customs and ISPS purposes. Up to 500 
nautical miles or 24 hours steaming time from Australia, information is sought on a 
voluntary basis on the identity, course and speed of vessels intending to transit 
Australia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or territorial sea.
38
  
The Oceans Policy flagged the need to develop Australia’s ability to defeat 
threats in its sea and air approaches by expanding its submarine capabilities and 
making cost effective investments in the defensive and offensive capabilities of its 
fleet of surface combatants.
39
 The plans for naval force modernization announced in 
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper reflect recent developments in addressing this 
challenge although their realization will occur over a lengthy time frame and will be 
subject to fluctuations in the national budget and the ability to achieve projected 
savings by the Defence organization. The White Paper recognizes that “major surface 
combatants (destroyers and frigates), submarines and other naval capabilities, 
supported by air combat (for air superiority and maritime strike) and maritime 
surveillance and response assets are necessary to establish sea control, and to project 
force in [Australia’s] maritime environment (including for the purposes of 
maintaining freedom of navigation, protecting our shipping, and lifting and supporting 
land forces).”
40
 In acquisition terms, the White Paper announces that by the mid 
2030s the Government will double the size of the submarine force with 12 more 
capable submarines to replace the current fleet of six Collins Class submarines and 
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replace the current Anzac class frigate with a more capable Future Frigate with 
optimal capabilities for anti-submarine warfare.
41
 The rationale provided for the 
acquisition of the augmented submarine force is that future strategic circumstances in 
the region and beyond will necessitate “a substantially expanded submarine fleet in 
order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend 
Australia’s approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia), protect 
and support other ADF assets and undertake other strategic missions where the stealth 
and operating characteristics of highly capable advance submarines would be 
crucial.”
42
 The White Paper also emphasizes the deterrent value of such a submarine 
force for potential adversaries.
43
 
The ability of Australia’s maritime surveillance and enforcement resources to 
respond to illegal activity within Australia’s offshore zones including illegal foreign 
fishing, customs and quarantine offences and drug trafficking will be further enhanced 
by the proposed consolidation of maritime law enforcement powers in a single 
Commonwealth statute. In September 2009, the Australian Government announced 
the introduction of a Maritime Powers Bill in 2010 to provide a uniform set of 
maritime enforcement powers. The proposed Maritime Powers Bill will consolidate 
the wide array of maritime law enforcement powers contained in 38 separate pieces of 
Commonwealth legislation by: 
• Establishing comprehensive powers on interdiction, boarding, search, 
seizure and retention of vessels; 
• Ensuring a common enforcement approach to promote coordination 
between agencies; 
• Creating a mechanism to implement and enforce international 
agreements that have a maritime aspect.
44
 
Regional and Global Initiatives 
Collaboration with regional and global partners in implementing oceans management 
regimes was identified in the Oceans Policy as a key challenge and critical to 
protecting Australia’s national interests at sea as well as those of the global 
community.
45
 Since the Oceans Policy was issued, Australia has made considerable 
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progress in establishing both ad hoc and ongoing cooperation arrangements with 
regional and global partners to combat criminal activity at sea. Examples of this are 
evident in the spheres of illegal foreign fishing, people smuggling and counter piracy 
operations.  
Since 1997, the Australian Government has mounted a concerted challenge to 
foreign fishing vessels (FFVs) fishing illegally in the exclusive economic zone off its 
sub Antarctic territories, Heard and McDonald Islands. Addressing this challenge has 
entailed operational responses and legal developments which involve the broadest 
interpretation of the current international law framework for maritime law 
enforcement. The primary target species for illegal fishers in these waters has been the 
Patagonian toothfish. Australian fishermen began fishing for these species off Heard 
and McDonald Islands in 1997 and unlicensed FFVs were also operating in the area.
46
 
Most of these were registered in flag of convenience States which maintained very 
limited control over their activities.
47
  Lucrative potential returns made these waters 
an attractive prospect for the FFVs. Initially enforcement was hampered by FFVs 
contacting each other to report on the location of enforcement vessels and the extreme 




The Australian Navy conducted its first enforcement operation in the Heard 
and McDonald Islands area in October 1997, arresting two FFVs, the Aliza Glacial 
(Panama registered) and the Salvora (Belize registered).
49
 Since 1997 six further 
FFVs have been arrested with two, the South Tomi (Togo registered) and the Viarsa 
(Uruguay registered) being apprehended in waters south of South Africa following 
lengthy hot pursuits by the civilian patrol vessel Southern Supporter in 2001 and 
2003.
50
 Following the Viarsa hot pursuit, the Australian Government announced that 
it would initiate full time armed patrols to the Southern Ocean to meet the escalating 
threat of illegal fishing. A full time contracted vessel, the Oceanic Viking, capable of 
operating all year in almost any weather conditions was chartered to undertake 
fisheries and customs patrols.
51
 
Strengthened bilateral cooperation has also played an important role in 
addressing this significant maritime challenge. Australia and France concluded an 





 The treaty provided a framework to enhance cooperative 
surveillance of FFVs in the neighbouring territorial seas and exclusive economic 
zones of Australia and France’s sub Antarctic islands. It provides for the exchange of 
information about the location, movements and other details of vessels suspected of 
fishing illegally to facilitate operational responses, logistical support in the conduct of 
hot pursuits and the undertaking of cooperative research on marine living resources.
53
 
There is also provision for surveillance of each party’s maritime zones with the 
consent of the relevant coastal State.
54
 It establishes a consent regime allowing for the 
continuation of hot pursuit into the other party’s territorial sea provided the other 
State is informed and no physical law enforcement or coercive action is taken against 
the pursued vessel during this phase of the hot pursuit.
55
 Under the 2003 Treaty, 
practical cooperation has taken place with Australian customs and fisheries officers 
taking part in French patrols and French enforcement officials participating in 
Australian patrols. Cooperative activities have also included establishment of a shared 
register of FFVs licensed to fish in French and Australian waters and exchange of 
information on suspected illegal FFVs.
56
 
In 2007 Australia and France extended their cooperation with the conclusion 
of a further bilateral agreement on cooperative enforcement of fisheries laws in the 
maritime zones adjacent to their sub Antarctic islands.
57
 The 2007 Treaty formalizes 
cooperative enforcement of the two States fisheries laws allowing each party’s 
enforcement officers to apprehend alleged FFVs in each other’s adjacent EEZs.
58
 
Setting aside the clear practical advantages of the 2003 and 2007 treaties in enhancing 
cooperative maritime surveillance and enforcement for Australia and France in the 
Southern Ocean, the treaties provisions on hot pursuit raise a number of questions 
concerning their consistency with relevant LOSC provisions. Key provisions in the 
2003 and 2007 treaties authorize each State’s enforcement vessels to maintain hot 
pursuits through each other’s maritime zones in the area of cooperation including 
through each other’s territorial seas.
59
 Article 111(3) of the LOSC provides that the 
right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its 
own or a third State. A literal reading of this provision would appear to preclude 
French enforcement vessels or Australian enforcement vessels from continuing a hot 
pursuit through the other’s territorial sea. In support of the legitimacy of the 2003 and 
2007 treaty provisions on hot pursuit, however, is the argument that the treaty partners 
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have consented to the continuation of such a hot pursuit and the pursuing vessel 
would not therefore be infringing on the sovereignty of the coastal State. The critical 
question in any subsequent prosecution of a FFV, however, would be whether a hot 
pursuit through the territorial sea of a third State is consistent with Article 111(3) of 
the LOSC and whether it could be challenged as an invalid exercise of the right of hot 
pursuit by the flag State of the pursued vessel. Notwithstanding this legal ambiguity, 
the measures taken by Australia in cooperation with France over recent years to 
counter illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean appear to have resulted in successful 
deterrence of illegal fishers in this area of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction. 
The resurgence of people smuggling in the water gap between Indonesia and 
Australia in 2008 and 2009 has heightened the need for continued and enhanced 
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia to apprehend vessels carrying asylum 
seekers and to investigate and prosecute offenders.
60
 Addressing this challenge entails 
both maritime and terrestrial dimensions. In the framework for security cooperation 
contained in the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the 
Framework for Security Cooperation (Lombok Treaty) of November 2006 which 
entered into force on 7 February 2008, law enforcement cooperation has been 
elevated to the same level as more traditional security concerns such as defence and 
counter terrorism.
61
 In this treaty, Indonesia and Australia have agreed to deepening 
and expanding their bilateral cooperation at multiple levels to prevent, respond to, 
investigate and prosecute transnational crimes such as people smuggling.
62
 At the 9
th
 
Australia/Indonesia Ministerial Forum in 2008, Ministers released a Joint Statement 
on people smuggling and trafficking in persons that re-affirmed their continuing 
commitment to combating people smuggling and trafficking in persons and to 
cooperating with source, transit and destination countries.
63
 They agreed to enhance 
their bilateral cooperation through increased operational assistance and information 
sharing and exploring measures to strengthen their respective domestic legal 
frameworks consistent with the relevant international instruments.
64
  
The forum nominated to achieve this objective is the Bali Process on People 
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, co-chaired by 
Australia and Indonesia, and involving more than 50 countries from the Asia Pacific 
region and beyond as well as international organizations such as the UN High 
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Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration.
65
 The 
inception of the Bali Process in February 2002 was in response to the last spike in 
people smuggling operations between Indonesia and Australia.
66
 In its first few years, 
the Bali Process established a range of multilateral initiatives between member 
countries to combat people smuggling which involved operational and policy officials 
from police, immigration, justice and development agencies.
67
 Many of these 
initiatives were centred on implementing the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land Sea and Air supplementing the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (People Smuggling Protocol) which is intended to 
prevent and combat people smuggling as well as promoting cooperation among States 
Parties to protect the rights of smuggled migrants.
68
 The early momentum of the Bali 
Process, with two ministerial meetings in 2002 and 2003 and a series of regional 
capacity building activities produced some very positive results including enhanced 
police to police cooperation, people smuggling legislation in some countries which 
previously had not criminalised this conduct and improved border control and 
document identification systems.
69
 The initial enthusiasm for the people smuggling 
aspects of the process diminished from 2004, however, as people smuggling voyages 
between Indonesia and Australia lessened and the focus of the process focused more 
on measures to combat trafficking in persons.
70
 
The Bali Process was re-invigorated at a third Ministerial meeting held in 
April 2009 where the Co-Chairs statement re-emphasized the original objectives of 
the Process and acknowledged some additional incentives for the resurgence of 
people smuggling including the global financial crisis and the intensification of 
conflicts within and beyond the region.
71
 The Ad Hoc groups formed to implement 
earlier Bali Process initiatives have been re-established and tasked with developing 
practical outcomes at the operational level to assist countries in mitigating increased 
irregular population movements, enhancing information sharing agreements between 
most affected countries and reporting back to the Co-Chairs of the Process with 
concrete recommendations to inform future regional cooperation on people smuggling 
and trafficking in persons.
72
 One area that the Bali Process has not yet addressed is the 
possibility of cooperative maritime surveillance and enforcement agreements between 
neighbouring countries to detect and apprehend people smuggling boats. Precedents 
for this type of cooperation exist in the illegal fishing arena between Australia and 
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France in the Southern Ocean and between some Pacific Island States. The Bali 
Process has now entered a more mature phase in which it appears that it will go 
beyond fundamental capacity building and prevention to developing specific 
measures to address people smuggling problems at the request of the most affected 
States.
73
 A tailored solution for cooperative detection and apprehension of people 
smuggling boats between Indonesia and Australia is a potential product of this re-
invigorated Process. 
At a global level, Australia is also contributing to counter piracy operations in 
the Horn of Africa region which underpin the freedom of access of all vessels to 
transit these parts of the ocean unimpeded.  A surge in piracy and armed robbery 
against shipping off the Horn of Africa since late 2008 by Somali pirates has 
prompted unparalleled cooperation between concerned States who have despatched 
warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden and waters off the coast of Somalia.
74
  The Horn 
of Africa contains some of the world’s most heavily travelled shipping routes with 
some 33,000 ship transits through the Red Sea choke point of the Bab-al–Mandeb 
Strait annually mainly en route to and from the Suez Canal.
75
 In 2008 there was a 
large increase in piracy and armed robbery attacks against ships transiting the Horn of 
Africa region with 111 attacks against ships and 42 successful hijackings.
76
 The trend 
continued in 2009 and 2010 with 47 successful hijackingsin 2009 and 49 in 2010 and 
the pirates range extending beyond the coast of Somali and the Gulf of Aden into the 
Western Indian Ocean.  The piracy incidents have included attacks on a wide array of 
vessels ranging from traditional dhows, yachts and fishing trawlers to super tankers, 
passenger cruisers and other large trading vessels.
77
 
• The global response to the piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa has 
encompassed a variety of measures. A series of Security Council Resolutions have 
been passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizing member 
States of the UN to act against the piracy attacks. Initially Resolution 1816 of 2 
June 2008 authorized member States cooperating with the Somali Transitional 
Federal Government to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and to use “all 
necessary means” to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in a manner 
“consistent with the relevant provisions of international law.”
78
 In passing this 
Resolution the Security Council had clearly taken into account the unstable 
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political conditions in Somalia and its inability to undertake maritime law 
enforcement in waters under its jurisdiction and beyond. Security Council 
Resolution 1838 of 7 October 2008 reinforced Resolution 1816 and called upon 
“all States interested in the security of maritime activities to take part actively in 
the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, in particular by 
deploying naval vessels and military aircraft.”
79
  In a further Resolution 1851 of 
16 December 2008 the Security Council encouraged States to establish an 
international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact among 
them on all aspects of the fight against piracy off Somalia.
80
 Subsequent 
resolutions, particularly Resolution 1918 of 27 April 2010 have expressed concern 
that the failure to prosecute those responsible for piracy has undermined anti 
piracy efforts by the international community.
81
 Resolution 1950 of 23 November 
2010 re-authorized States to intervene in acts of piracy by Somali pirates at sea for 
a further period of 12 months.
82
 It expressed ongoing concern at the threat of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea and noted that this threat now extended beyond 
Somalia to the Western Indian Ocean and children were involved. Member States 
were urged to improve the capacity of authorities in Somalia to prosecute those 
planning and undertaking attacks, to determine jurisdiction and to criminalise 
piracy under their domestic laws. 
 
The principal global response to the piracy off the Horn of Africa has been a 
naval one. Warships from the United States, Canada, a number of European states, 
Russia, India, China, Japan and more recently Australia are now or have recently been 
active in the waters off the Horn of Africa.
83
 Within the region, anti piracy efforts are 
coordinated and information shared under the Code of Conduct concerning the 
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean, 
concluded in Djibouti in January 2009.
84
 Several concurrent naval operations are 
occurring in the region. In October 2008 NATO launched a counter piracy operation 
called Allied Provider which was succeeded on 17 August 2009 by Operation Ocean 
Shield.
85
  In December 2008, the European Union initiated Operation Atalanta which 
includes warships from ten countries and in January 2009, the United States 
established Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 which now includes a warship from the 
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Australian Navy on an as required basis.
86
 To enhance protection of shipping in the 
heavily transited Gulf of Aden area, a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) has 
been defined to provide a common system of reference which allows navies patrolling 
the area to de-conflict their activities. Running through the MSPA, an Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) has been established and group transits of 
shipping through the IRTC are protected by ships from CTF 151, NATO and 
European Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR).
87
 
The naval response to piracy off the Horn of Africa of which Australia is part, 
has assisted in maintaining a degree of maritime security and freedom of access for 
shipping in the region but it has not curbed or significantly decreased the number of 
piracy attacks on shipping in the region or addressed the root cause of the problem 
which lies in the lack of governance, political instability and poverty which are rife in 
Somalia itself. A particular problem that participating Australian Navy vessels face in 
contributing to these operations is the dilemma of what to do with captured Somali 
pirates. As there is no functioning central government operating in Somalia, pirates 
cannot be handed over to Somali authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
Although they could be tried under Australian law, detaining and transporting them to 
Australia for trial would represent a considerable burden on the Government’s 
resources. Although some States participating in the naval patrols off the Horn of 
Africa have negotiated transfer agreements with countries in the region such as Kenya 
to accept the pirates for investigation and prosecution, Australia has been unable to 
secure such an agreement thus far.
88
 All these factors militate against States in 
Australia’s circumstances taking criminal justice action against apprehended pirates 
and have led to the adoption of a catch and release policy where the pirates’ weapons 
are confiscated and the pirates themselves are released.
89
 Australia’s contribution to 
this global maritime challenge, while beneficial in maintaining a degree of security 
for shipping transiting these areas, falls short of establishing a substantial deterrent to 
this form of criminal activity at sea. 
Maintenance of regional and global maritime security as well as security and 
integrity of resources in Australia’s own offshore zones will require ongoing 
extension and development of existing frameworks for cooperative maritime 
surveillance and enforcement across national boundaries and on the high seas. Future 
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maritime challenges for Australia in conjunction with global and regional partners 
may include surveillance and enforcement operations related to high seas fishing of 
highly migratory stocks and straddling stocks and collaborative monitoring of other 
high seas activities such as marine genetic resource exploitation, climate change 
mitigation activities and dumping operations by ships in order to prevent adverse 
impacts on high seas biodiversity and maintain high seas resources for current and 
future generations. 
Understanding the Oceans and their Relationship to Global Climate 
Australia’s Oceans Policy anticipated the global preoccupation with mitigating and 
adapting to the adverse effects of human induced climate change and the need to 
understand the role of the oceans in that process. The challenge articulated in relation 
to climate change and variability was to improve and disseminate Australia’s 
knowledge of the oceans in climate change, including sea level rise and the uptake of 
carbon dioxide.
90
 The Oceans Policy also recognised that where possible Australia 
should identify alternative energy sources including ocean based energy and 
investigate the potential for using the ocean’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases.
91
 
In relation to ocean based energy sources the Policy encouraged the development, use 
and export of Australia’s ocean energy resources, technology and expertise to their 
full commercial potential within the limits of ecological sustainability and identified 
five potential ocean based energy sources: wind, tidal, wave, ocean thermal and ocean 
currents.
92
 Australia’s vast maritime jurisdiction represents an enormous asset in 
responding to climate change and variability, however, national development of ocean 
based energy sources and climate change mitigation activities associated with the 
ocean is still at an early stage.  
Ocean Based Energy Sources in Australia 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Fourth Assessment Report 
states that the potential marine energy resource of wind driven waves, gravitational 
tide ranges, thermal gradients between warm surface water and cooler water at depths 
of > 1000m, salinity gradients and marine currents is huge but what is currently 
exploitable as the economic potential of these energy sources is low.
93
 The Report 
recommends the rapid development of renewable energy technologies to eventually 
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overtake fossil fuel sources of energy.
94
 In order to maximise the potential of these 
new technologies, sustained government support and supportive regulatory 
frameworks will be necessary over the coming decades. In its statements on 
renewable energy targets, the Australian Government has committed itself to ensuring 
that 20% of Australia’s electricity supply comes from renewable energy by 2020.
95
  
Australia has suitable climates for wave energy particularly off the coast of 
Western Australia. In an article on climate change and renewable energy from the 
ocean and tides, David Leary and Miguel Esteban describe the pre-commercial wave 
energy projects being undertaken by three companies off the Australian coastline.
96
 
The Western Australian company Carnegie Corporation has developed the CETO 
wave power converter which produces high pressure seawater from the power of 
waves which is used to power on shore turbines that produce electricity. Commercial 
testing of the CETO apparatus was completed in 2009 and construction of a 
commercial scale plant is due for completion and connection to the electricity grid by 
2013.
97
 Another company Biopower Systems was planning to pilot wave power 
apparatus on King Island and Flinders Island in conjunction with Hydro Tasmania in 
2009.
98
 Oceanlinx re-deployed its pilot wave energy device at Port Kembla on the 
New South Wales coast south of Sydney during 2009.
99
 A major hurdle for all these 
projects is the attraction of sufficient ongoing investment to become viable 
commercial operations and finding suitable locations for the deployment of wave 
energy devices which accommodate other ocean uses in the relevant areas and are 
approved by government authorities. 
Climate Change Mitigation Options Involving the Ocean 
The capacity of the ocean to act a storage receptacle and to absorb rising levels of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has been the focus of a number of activities 
designed to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on the environment. As the 
impacts of climate change begin to be felt, States and policy makers are turning to 
marine geo-engineering schemes as part of the solution. Used irresponsibly, ocean 
based climate change mitigation options could have catastrophic consequences for the 
marine environment.
100
 For this reason regulatory frameworks subjecting such 
activities to environmental safeguards are growing in importance. 
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One of the earliest climate change mitigation schemes associated with the 
ocean involves the permanent sequestration of carbon dioxide emissions from large 
point sources such as fossil fuel fired power plants, steel works and fuel processing 
plants into sub-seabed geological formations.
101
 The process involves separating 
carbon dioxide from flue gases and pressurising it for transport by pipeline or vessel 
to a sub-seabed storage site such as depleted oil or gas fields or deep subterranean and 
sub-sea saline aquifers.
102
 The principal risk associated with carbon dioxide disposal 
in the sub-seabed is the potential for leakage of carbon dioxide and any other 
substances in the carbon dioxide stream such as heavy metals into the marine 
environment either during transport to a storage site or after storage.
103
 Considerable 
research has been undertaken by States and corporations in developed countries to 
assess and minimise the risks associated with sub seabed sequestration of carbon 




Australia is one of the first countries in the world to legislate for offshore 
carbon capture and storage. The Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas 
Storage) Act 2008 aims to provide certainty for operators regarding access and title to 
offshore greenhouse gas storage formations while also ensuring storage is safe and 
secure. Actual greenhouse gas injection will be regulated through an injection licence 
requiring a comprehensive site plan.
105
 At the end of an injection site’s life, 
decommissioning reports must be submitted to the appropriate Minister together with 
suggestions for monitoring, measurement and verification. The holder of a licence 
will not be free of statutory liability until a site closing certificate has been issued. The 
requirement for site closing certificate includes a thorough assessment of migratory 
behaviour of the injected greenhouse gas.
106
 As a result of amendments to the Bill in 
the Senate, the Act contains a provision on transfer of long term liability from the 
operator to the Government at the end of a closure assurance period which is to be a 
minimum of 15 years. The Act also includes a 20 year sunset period on the 
proponent’s liability for damages.
107
 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report acknowledges that the fertilization of 
the oceans may also be a strategy for removing carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere.
108
 The process of open ocean fertilization uses iron and other micro 
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nutrients to increase phytoplankton growth in iron and other nutrient deficient areas of 
the ocean in order to promote further draw down of photosynthesised carbon into the 
deep ocean.
109
 The Southern Ocean is one of the areas of the ocean which is iron 
deficient.
110
 There are a variety of risks and uncertainties associated with open ocean 
fertilization which have excited concern among scientists and environmentalists. The 
effects of stimulating phytoplankton growth on other marine organisms and 
ecosystems are poorly understood.
111
 Increased phytoplankton growth may boost the 
production of other greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide neutralising the positive 
effects of carbon dioxide draw down and the sinking of phytoplankton blooms into 
the deep ocean may reduce oxygen levels at these depths with adverse consequences 
for fish and other marine organisms.
112
 The sustainability of open ocean fertilization 
has also been called into question on the basis of the lengthy time frames and huge 




Guidelines for assessing the impact of ocean fertilization experiments on the 
marine environment have been developed by the Scientific Groups of the London 
Convention and Protocol.
114
 The risk assessment framework on ocean fertilization 
takes a risk analysis approach to the decision to approve ocean fertilization 
experiments as legitimate scientific research. The  framework provides that a decision 
to approve ocean fertilization and to determine that it is legitimate scientific research 
which is not contrary to the aims of the London Convention and Protocol should 
ensure that the scientific objectives of the experiment can be met and that, as far as 
practicable, environmental disturbance and detriment are minimized and benefits 
maximised. The proponent of an ocean fertilization experiment must prepare an 
impact hypothesis which forms the basis for impact monitoring. Now the risk 
assessment framework has been endorsed by the London Convention and Protocol 
Parties, it  opens the way to ocean fertilization experiments on a larger scale in waters 
within and beyond national jurisdiction. For ocean fertilization experiments under 
Australian national jurisdiction or control, the challenge will be to put in place 
sufficiently rigorous environmental safeguards to prevent adverse impacts on the 





This article has examined a selection of Australia’s maritime challenges and priorities 
through the prism of Australia’s 1998 Oceans Policy which was the first 
comprehensive Commonwealth Government policy statement on ocean related issues. 
The Oceans Policy described a complex and multifaceted set of challenges and 
projected responses and had the ultimate objective of achieving integrated and 
ecosystem based management for marine areas under Australian national jurisdiction. 
Analysis of three policy areas highlighted in the Oceans Policy, defining Australia’s 
maritime jurisdiction, protecting Australia’s national interests at sea and 
understanding the oceans and their relationship to global climate reveals that some of 
the challenges identified in the Oceans Policy have been successfully addressed, 
others will require ongoing commitment and others have evolved into more urgent 
and substantial challenges. Australia has reached an advanced stage in defining its 
maritime boundaries having negotiated delimitation agreements or joint resource 
development arrangements with all its neighbouring States. The challenge now lies in 
conserving, managing and exploiting the resources and biodiversity in all of the areas 
under its national jurisdiction in an ecologically sustainable manner. As an island 
continent with an extensive coastline, significant offshore territories and enormous 
areas of ocean under its national jurisdiction the task of protecting Australia’s national 
interests at sea is constant and daunting in its complexity. Maintaining border security 
and combating the poaching of Australia’s fisheries by FFVs have been the focus of 
significant Government policy initiatives, resource investment and legislative action 
in the years since Australia’s Oceans Policy was issued. While these challenges will 
continue to absorb Australian Government resources for the foreseeable future, 
positive developments have occurred in cooperative maritime surveillance and 
development with neighbouring States such as France in the Southern Ocean and in 
criminal justice cooperation links with Indonesia. Finally Australia is just beginning 
to address the emerging challenge of harnessing the oceans to combat climate change 
with the development of technology and regulatory frameworks for ocean based 
energy and offshore carbon capture. The addition of new areas of maritime 
jurisdiction in the form of the extended continental shelf, the presence of ongoing 
threats to Australia’s resource and border security represented by illegal fishers and 
people smuggling operations and the considerable investment required for ocean 
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based technology to combat climate change highlights the need for a comprehensive 
re-assessment of the challenges and priorities outlined in Australia’s Oceans Policy in 
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